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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper provides a review of the literature on the 
development impact of migration and remittances 
on origin countries and on destination countries in 
the South. International migration is an ever-growing 
phenomenon that has important development 
implications for both sending and receiving countries. 
For a sending country, migration and the resulting 
remittances lead to increased incomes and poverty 
reduction, and improved health and educational 
outcomes, and promote economic development. 
Yet these gains might come at substantial social 
costs to the migrants and their families. Since 
many developing countries are also large recipients 
of international migrants, they face challenges of 
integration of immigrants, job competition between 
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migrant and native workers, and fiscal costs associated 
with provision of social services to the migrants. This 
paper also summarizes incipient discussions on the 
impacts of migration on climate change, democratic 
values, demographics, national identity, and security. 
In conclusion, the paper highlights a few policy 
recommendations calling for better integration of 
migration in development policies in the South and 
the North, improving data collection on migration and 
remittance flows, leveraging remittances for improving 
access to finance of recipient households and countries, 
improving recruitment mechanisms, and facilitating 
international labor mobility through safe and legal 
channels.Impact of Migration on Economic and Social 
Development: A Review of Evidence and Emerging 
Issues  
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Impact of Migration on Economic and Social Development: A 




This  paper  provides  a  review  of  the  literature  on  the  development  impact  of 
migration and remittances on origin countries and on destination countries in the South. 
International migration has development implications for origin and destination countries 
in the South and in the North. Some 215 million people or 3 percent of the world’s 
population are believed to live outside their countries of birth (United Nations 2009). 
While  the  focus  in  the  literature  has  been  on  South-North  migration,  the  number  of 
migrants  between  developing  countries  is  estimated  to  be  as  large  as  the  number  of 
migrants moving from South to North (Ratha & Shaw 2007). Thus, the development 
implications of migration and the need to manage in-migration are as relevant to the 
South  as  they  are  to  the  North.  Although  violent  conflict,  political  persecution,  and 
trafficking  are  important  causes  for  international  mobility,  more  than  9  out  of  10 
international migrants move for economic reasons. By and large, migration has positive 
economic impacts on the migrant household, the sending country as well as the receiving 
country. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  discussion  of  the 
development implications, first economic and then social impacts, of migration for origin 
countries.  Section  3  discusses  the  available  evidence  on  the  impact  of  migration  on 
destination countries in the South. Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of selected 
emerging  migration  issues  such  as  environment  and  climate  change,  fertility  and 
demographic  patterns,  democratic  processes,  and  national  security,  and  some  policy 
recommendations  for  enhancing  the  impact  of  migration  on  economic  and  social 
development.
1   
 
                                                 
1 While some of the topics are new in relation to migration, some have been widely discussed by 
practitioners in this context. However, the academic literature is still largely underdeveloped in these areas 
making them ’emerging topics’ in relation to available migration research. 3 
 
2. Development implications of migration for the origin countries  
Migration  is  a  decision  that  impacts  the  welfare  of  the  household,  the  home 
community, and in the end the whole economy in various ways (Azam and Gubert 2006). 
The welfare implications of migration on the origin country are most often, though not 
always,  sizable  and  positive.  The  main  channels  through  which  migration  alleviates 
poverty are increased incomes from remittances, ability to smooth consumption, access to 
finance for starting a new business, as well as tapping on to the knowledge and resources 
provided by the international community of the migrant diaspora. Besides pure monetary 
gains,  migration  and  remittances  allow  for  higher  investment  in  health  care  and 
education. Yet, not all impacts are positive: exploitation of migrants by unscrupulous 
recruiters or employers is reportedly widespread; separation from family can be stressful 
for  migrants;  and  large  scale  immigration  can  pose  serious  challenges  to  a  nation’s 
identity and sovereignty.  
2.1 Economic implications for the country of origin 
While migration has economic, social, and cultural implications for the sending 
and host societies, remittances the migrants send home are perhaps the most tangible and 
least controversial link between migration and development (Ratha 2007). According to 
the official estimates, migrants from developing countries sent over $315 billion to their 
origin countries in 2009, three times the size of official development assistance (Ratha et 
al. 2010). The true size of remittances including unrecorded flows through formal and 
informal channels is likely to be even higher. While remittances to developing countries 
declined  modestly  in  2009  because  of  the  global  financial  crisis,  these  flows  have 
remained  resilient  compared  to  private  capital  flows,  and  have  become  even  more 
important as a source of external financing in many developing countries.  
Migration and remittances have both direct and indirect effects on the welfare of 
the population in the migrant sending countries.
2 A cross-country study of 71 developing 
countries found that a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances 
will lead to 3.5 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty (Ada ms & Page 
                                                 
2See World Bank (2005), UNDP (2009), Skeldon (2002), Kothari (2002), and De Haas (2005). 4 
 
2005). Evidence from Latin America, Africa, South Asia and other regions suggests that 
remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty, as well as indirectly stimulate 
economic  activity  (Adams  1991,  Lachaud  1999,  Fajnzylber  &  Lopez  2007,  Adams 
2006b,  Gupta  et  al.  2007,  Anyanwu  and  Erhijakpor  2010,  Ajayi  et  al.  2009).  The 
dramatic increase in remittances was responsible for one third to one half of the overall 
reduction in headcount poverty rate in Nepal from 42 percent in 1995-96 to 31 percent in 
2003-04 (World Bank 2006a).  
Remittances have been found to have an income stabilizing effect at  both the 
macroeconomic level (World Bank 2006b, Chami et al. 2009) and at the household level. 
Historically, remittances have tended to rise in times of economic downturns, financial 
crises, and natural disasters because migrants living abroad send more money to help 
their  families  back  home  (World  Bank  2006b,  Yang  2006,  Yang  and  Choi  2007, 
Mohapatra  et  al.  2010).  In  Ghana,  remittances  were  found  to  help  households  to 
minimize  the  effects  of  economic  shocks  on  household  welfare  (Quartey  2006).
3 
Remittance-receiving households in Ethiopia used their cash reserves and thus avoided 
having to sell their livestock to cope with drought   (Mohapatra  et  al.  2009).  Recent 
evidence  from  Mali  confirms  that  a  substantial  part  of  remittances  is  saved  for 
unexpected events and the migrant thus serves as an insurer for the whole household 
(Ponsot & Obegi 2010).  
Cross-country  analysis indicates that remittances are  related to  greater income 
inequality  in  Africa  (Anyanwu  &  Erhijakpor  2010)  and  Latin  America  (Barham  & 
Boucher 1998). However, other studies suggest that migration enhances the welfare of 
the rural poor disproportionally, for example, in Mexico (Stark and Taylor 1980), in rural 
Egypt  (Adams  1991)  and  in  other  regions  (Portes  2009).
4  Migration  may  also  raise 
inequality initially, as only the relatively well -off have the resources to send workers 
                                                 
3 The consumption smoothing effect of remittances allows households to engage in high-risk but possibly 
more profitable economic activities that have a poverty-reducing effect, but that in absence of migration 
would have been difficult. See Morduch (1994) for discussion on stochastic poverty causing chronic 
poverty in absence of credit markets. 
4 The impact of remittances on inequality depends on the initial position of the recipients in the income 
distribution: in Mexico 61 percent of the remittance receiving households fall in the first quintile of non-
remittance income, whereas in Peru fewer than 6 percent of the remittance-receivers belong to the lowest 
quintile (Fajnzylber & Lopez 2007, p. 6). 5 
 
abroad and therefore receive remittances (Lipton 1980).  However, as migrant networks 
are established in the destination countries, the cost of migration falls so that the less 
well-off can afford to migrate (Taylor et al. 2005; Koechlin & Leon 2007, Docquier et al. 
2010a). 
Migrant remittances increase domestic savings as well as improve financial 
intermediation  (Aggrawal  et  al.  2006,  Toxopeus  and  Lensink  2007),
5  which  can 
improve growth prospects (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2005).  Evidence from Philippines, 
Mexico and other countries suggests that remittances increase the accumulation of assets 
in farm equipment, promote self-employment and increase small business investments in 
migrant-sending areas  (Taylor  1992  Taylor, Wyatt  1996,  Lucas 1987,  Adams 2006a, 
Woodruff & Zenteno 2001, and Yang 2008).  
Factoring the remittance inflows correctly into macroeconomic analysis is  also 
likely to improve the credit rating  and external debt-sustainability  of the remittance-
receiving country (Abdih et al. 2009, Avendano et al. 2009, IMF 2010, Ratha et al. 
2010).
 Because they are a large and stable source of foreign currency, remittances are 
likely to curtail investor panic and prevent sudden current account reversals during a 
crisis  (Bugamelli  &  Paterno  2006,  Gupta  et  al.  2007).  Furthermore,  future  flows  of 
remittances  can  be  used  as  collateral  by  governments  and  private  sector  entities  in 
developing countries to raise financing in international capital market (Ketkar and Ratha 
2005,  2009).  These  innovative  financing  mechanisms  can  be  used  to  raise  funds  for 
development projects such as low-income housing, or water supply. 
The  diaspora  serves  as  a  link  between  the  sending  and  receiving 
communities, expands the opportunities to access international financing, and facilitates 
networking. The diaspora also  contribute through philanthropic remittances  (Goldring 
2004), and the development of their former communities through hometown associations 
and collective financing of development projects such as schools, health facilities and 
community infrastructure such as the ―Tres Por Uno‖ program in Mexico (Ghosh 2006; 
                                                 
5 In some cases migration is a response to failures in the market for insurance and credit, so that emigration 
of one household member works as a second best solution to relax the credit constraint of the household 
(Taylor 1992). 6 
 
Orozco  2009,  World  Bank  2006b,  UNDP  2009).  Access  to  information  through  the 
diaspora  and  the  skills  learned  by  returning  migrants  can  improve  technology
1, 
management  and institutions in the s ending  country, and lower the fixed cost and 
knowledge  requirements  for  setting  up  an  international  business  (Carling  2005). 
Emigrants may also be an important supply of foreign investment, as their knowledge of 
their home country institutions (and perhaps   a greater ability to maneuver within the 
home country regulatory framework) may mean that they incur lower investment costs 
and/or higher returns, compared to other international investors.  
In the current environment of a  credit crunch after the financia l crisis  several 
countries have started looking at the diaspora abroad as potential sources of capital 
(Ketkar and Ratha 2010). In the past, Israel and India  have raised over $35 billion of 
development financing  by issuing diaspora bonds (Ketkar and Ratha  2009). For the 
countries,  diaspora  bonds  represent  a  stable  and  cheap  source  of  external  finance, 
especially in times of financial stress.  Diaspora bonds have several advantages, both for 
the  issuer  and  for  the  emigrant  who  buys  the  bond:  Through  retailing  at  small 
denominations, issuers can tap into the wealth of relatively poor migrants , although 
diaspora bonds are not necessarily limited to migrants. Migrants are expected to be more 
loyal than the average investors in times of distress. And they might be   especially 
interested in financing infrastructure, housing, health and education projects.
6  
Migration contributes to human capital formation. There is a growing body of 
evidence  suggesting  that  the  income  from  remittances  is  disproportionally  spent  on 
education and health rather than everyday consumption (Adams 2005, Adams et al. 2008, 
World Bank 2006b, p. 126, Valero-Gil 2008; see Nagarajan 2009 for South Africa). Once 
in school, the children of migrants may be more likely to finish their education, as the 
increased  income  from  remittances  provide  additional  financial  resources  and  better 
prospects  associated  with  migration  influence  social  norms  and  incentives  towards 
                                                 
6 Ratha et al. (2008) estimate that Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise $5-10 billion per year 
by issuing diaspora bonds. Countries that can potentially consider diaspora bonds are Bangladesh, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (and also Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, South Korea and Spain). In September 2010 Greece announced a plan to issue diaspora bond 
to raise financing for debt servicing. 7 
 
gaining more education (Cox-Edwards and Ureta 2003 for El Salvador, Yang 2008 for 
Philippines,  UNDP  2009).
7  Evidence  from  rural  Pakistan  suggests  that  temporary 
migration  is associated with higher  school enrollment, especially for girls (Mansuri 
2006).  Furthermore,  migration  has  been  observed  to  increase  health  knowledge  in 
addition to the direct effect on wealth, which has led to lower rates of infant mortality and 
higher birth weights in Mexico (Hildebrandt & McKenzie 2005). Visiting and returning 
migrants may also bring back health-improving practices such as drinking safe water and 
better sanitation (UNDP 2009, p. 79). 
On the other hand, migration as such might also present a threat to migrant health 
as  certain  jobs  expose  migrants  to  occupational   hazards,  such  as  tuberculosis, 
pneumoconiosis and workplace injury by mine workers (Kahn  et al. 2003). Increased 
mobility of workers has also contributed to a rapid spread of communicable diseases such 
as  HIV  (Decosas  et  al.  1995;  Lurie  2000;  Lurie  et  al.  2000;  Brummer  2002).  For 
instance, Kane et al. (1993) find that 27 percent of the male Senegalese migrants were 
HIV positive compared to 1 percent for non-migrants males from the same area. Sexually 
transmitted infections are also more likely to spread among migrants themselves as well 
as their permanent partners residing in the sending communities (Kahn et al. 2003).  
High-skilled emigration or the so-called “brain drain” can imply a loss of 
public  resources  invested  in  their  education,  can  reduce  the  sending  country’s 
productive capacity, and can worsen the business environment, especially in small 
economies. The emigration  of the highly skilled can be particularly important  in  the 
education  and  health  sectors  in  small  countries  that  face  severe  shortages  of  health 
workers  (Docquier  et  al.  2010b).
8  Moreover, the departure of doctors may result in 
underemployment of nurses and other auxiliary staff (Commander et al. 2004). However, 
as argued by Dustmann et al. (2010), return migration can lead to mitigation of the brain 
drain, if not a net ―brain gain‖. When the migrants return, they have usually acquired 
skills  that  are  needed  in  the  sending  community  as  manifested  by  a  sizable  wage-
premium paid to the returned migrants (Wahba 2007). Furthermore, Mountford (1997) 
                                                 
7 Contradicting evidence has been found in Mexico (McKenzie & Rapoport 2009). 
8 For example, the vacancy rate in Ghana’s public sector health positions was 47 percent for doctors and 57 
percent for nurses in 2002 (Dovlo 2003). 8 
 
and Stark (2004) suggest that the possibility of emigrating abroad increases the interest in 
and returns to higher education, which can increase the total number of highly skilled 
also  in  the  home  country  (World  Bank  2006b,  p.  68).  Despite  concerns  about  the 
detrimental effects of brain drain on health, the shortage of health professionals in Africa 
is likely to stem from causes entirely unrelated to international migration (Clemens 2007) 
such as fragmented labor markets and insufficient public financing (Lucas 2006).
9  
Evidence  on  the  relationship  between  remittance  inflows  and  economic 
growth in migrant-sending countries remains inconclusive.
10 Empirical studies have 
found little evidence in support of a positive impact of remittances on economic growth 
(IMF 2005, World Bank 2006b; Spatafora 2005; Barajas et al. 2009; Singh et al. 2009). 
In  general,  studies  focusing  on  the  labor  supply  response  of  the  remittance-recipient 
households tend to find that remittances lower work efforts and hence reduce long-term 
growth (Azam & Gubert 2006; Chami et al. 2003). Other studies find that remittances 
improve  financial  access  and  financial  development  and  therefore  stimulate  growth 
(Toxopeus  &  Lensik  2007,  Giuliano  &  Ruiz-Arranz  2005,  Gupta  et  al.  2007). 
Furthermore, the merit of remittance flows might lie more on  increasing the level of 
income for the poor rather than the growth of the economy as  a whole (Jongwanich 
2007). Empirical evidence from Latin America and Cape Verde suggests that remittances 
can  lead  to  exchange  rate  appreciation,  which  can  reduce  the  competitiveness  of  the 
tradable sector, the so-called Dutch Disease (Bourdet & Falck 2006, Fajnzylber & Lopez 
2007,  Gupta  et  al.  2007).  However,  remittances  are  less  likely  than  natural  resource 
windfalls  to  result in  persistent  exchange  rate  misalignment, while  the exchange rate 
implications of relatively stable remittance flows are likely to be easier to manage than a 
comparatively abrupt shock due to a natural resource windfall (Ratha 2003, Rajan and 
                                                 
9 On the other hand, temporary migration in order to access medical services (see the case of Hong Kong 
nationals in Canada discussed in Preston et al. 2007) and the ever-growing phenomenon of medical tourism 
from North to South increases the demand for health care services in the destination countries. Experts 
estimate that medical tourists will bring $2.2 billion annually to India alone by 2012 (Hutchinson 2005), 
Increased demand by wealthy tourists has increased the number of medical providers also in Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, South Africa, Jordan, Malaysia, Hungary, Latvia and Estonia. This might spill 
over even to the domestic population through better access to health care, but the net effects of this medical 
’brain gain’ have still not been researched.  
10 Note that the gains from migration analysis discussed in box 1 shows that the relationship between in-
migration and economic growth in the migrant-receiving country is positive. 9 
 
Subramanian 2005,  IMF 2005).  In  general,  the  inconclusive results  on  the impact  of 
remittances and growth are largely due to the difficulty of separating the cause from the 
effect: if remittances react counter-cyclically to growth, then the negative relationship 
between the two is a result of reverse causality running from growth to remittances, not 
vice versa.    
2.2 Social impacts on the origin country 
At its best, migration can be a rewarding experience that is made in the interest of 
the household welfare, but in most cases moving to another country and being separated 
from one’s immediate family takes place at considerable emotional cost (D’Emilio et al. 
2007). Especially temporary circular migration increases the risk for family breakdown, 
fragmentation  of  social  networks  and  psychosocial  stress  (Kahn  et  al.  2003).  The 
emotional impact is not just limited to the migrants themselves, but also to the family left 
behind.  Especially  in  poorer  households  where  the  whole  family  cannot  afford  to 
emigrate  together,  they  emigrate  one  member  at  a  time  resulting  in  eroded  family 
structures and relationships.
11 As described by D’Emilio et al. (2007), the longer the 
separation  between  the  migrating  parents  and  their  children,  the  more  children  lose 
parents’ reference in the management of the household, their authority and their role as 
providers  of  love  and  material  care.  Parents  are  gradually  replaced  by  other  family 
members, or the children take upon themselves the task of parenting. The feelings of 
rejection,  abandonment  and  loss  follow  the  children  left  behind,  and  cannot  be 
compensated by the material gifts and remittances sent from abroad. To some extent the 
recent technological advances in terms of e-mail and affordable telephone calls might 
allow the transnational families to form and foster social ties even at a distance (UNDP 
2009, p. 76). 
Separation from the parents has also long-term consequences in all aspects of the 
children’s lives. Evidence from Mexico points to the fact that the offspring from migrant 
                                                 
11 Interpreting the high divorce rates among migrants is not always straightforward. While it is true that 
protracted separation can take its toll on family cohesion, Lucas (2005, 268) points out that those whose 
marriages were unstable to begin with are more likely to migrate. It is also true that migration provides new 
economic opportunities for women, and increased economic independence may provide them an escape 
from a failed marriage. Furthermore, migration might provide an exit strategy in societies where divorce is 
not an option.  10 
 
families  have  lower  educational  attainment  than  other  children,  as  the  boys  of  the 
migrants are more likely to opt for migration themselves (implying decreasing returns to 
education)  while  the  domestic  workload  of  the  daughters  increase  (McKenzie  & 
Rapoport 2006). Adolescents left behind are also commonly overrepresented in adapting 
risky  behavior,  and  absence  of  mothers  has  been  found  to  be  associated  with  the 
involvement of children with violence: 80 percent of children in conflict with the law in 
Jamaica had their mothers absent, while this was the case for only 30 percent of other 
children (D’Emilio et al. 2007). Also the abuse of drugs and alcohol as well as reduced 
school attendance has been observed among children left behind by migrants. On the 
other  hand,  recent  evidence  from  Mozambique  suggests  that  migration  could  also 
strengthen social networks as the higher income from remittances reduces the cost for the 
migrant-sending household to participate in these networks (Gallego & Mendola 2010). 
This closer inter-family collaboration can, to some extent, remedy the absence of within-
family cohesion and safety nets.  
Even  though  migration  is  usually  a  voluntary  and  planned  choice  of  the 
individual, the reality might turn out to be very different from the original expectations. 
Too  often  the  intended  aspirations  of  the  migrants  do  not  materialize  but  many  are 
trapped in trafficking. Young women are exploited as sex workers abroad, and in many 
cases they have been promised legitimate work at the destination but then forced into 
prostitution upon arrival (see e.g. Kebede 2001). Also children are commonly victims of 
trafficking that can lead to life-long trauma. The abuse of migrants by the middle men or 
the recruitment agencies is a problem that is growing in magnitude as the migration flows 
increase and the phenomenon becomes more commercialized. The problem expands from 
pure trafficking into working in slave-like conditions as the international market for labor 
allows for trading with workers’ contracts leading to abuse of individual migrants.
12 The 
abuse of the migrant workers has lead to calls for further regulation of the recruitment 
agencies across migration corridors (see e.g. Agunias 2010). 
                                                 
12 For instance, over 50 percent of migrant domestic workers surveyed in Kuwait reported physical 
(including sexual), psychological and verbal abuse at their work place. The female workers are also more 
vulnerable to sexual abuse by their male employers, who are often also their visa sponsors. (Chammartin 
2005) 11 
 
3. Impact of migration on the destination countries in the South 
Unlike  commonly  believed,  around  half  of  the  official  international  migration 
from the South is to other developing countries rather than wealthier countries in the 
North  (Ratha  &  Shaw  2007).  And  official  statistics  likely  underreport  South-South 
migration, especially between contiguous countries because of lack of border controls; 
almost  80  percent  of  the  South-South  migration  is  estimated  to  take  place  between 
countries with contiguous borders. 
3.1 Economic implications in the destination country 
Even  though  the  channels  transmitting  welfare  impacts  of  migration  on  the 
destination countries are well known in the literature, there is very limited amount of 
empirical evidence from the South quantifying the impacts. Thus, a brief overview of the 
evidence from the North is presented in box 1. Migration of people, just as international 
trade, benefits both the sending country and the receiving country (van der Mensbrugghe 
& Roland-Holst 2009). The welfare gain for the destination country is due to the fact that 
immigration increases the supply of labor, which increases employment, production and 
thus  GDP  (Ortega  and  Peri  2009).  Immigration  has  also  been  found  to  increase  the 
productivity  of  the  receiving  economies  through  the  contribution  of  migrants  to 
innovation (see box 1). Another way in which immigration increases productivity is that 
immigrants free up the local workforce to move to higher productivity occupations.  
Despite  the  benefits  of  immigration,  public  and  the  policymakers  at  the 
destination country usually believe that immigration can become an economic burden, as 
immigration is feared to lead to loss of jobs, heavy burden on public services, social 
tension  and  increased  criminality  (UNDP  2009,  p.  70)  despite  the  evidence  to  the 
contrary.
13  The  main  channels  for  negative  economic  outcome  for  the  destination 
countries are increased job competition that allegedly brings down the wages for the 
locals, and the increased fiscal burden for caring for a growing population of immigrants. 
                                                 
13 As noted by Hanson (2009), the economic benefits for allowing freer immigration to destination 
countries ―may simply not be worth the political hassle‖. 12 
 
 
Incoming migrants need to be integrated into the labor force, which intensifies the 
competition  for existing jobs.  Especially in  times  of economic downturn, the general 
public and the policymakers tend to become more worried about the potential adverse 
impact  of  immigration  on  natives’  opportunities,  and  immigrants  can  be  used  as 
scapegoats to blame for rising unemployment even though no strong evidence exists to 
show that immigrants take natives’ jobs (Papademetriou et al. 2009).
14 A common worry 
is also a downward pressure on salaries caused by an influx of migrant workers. Still, in 
the OECD countries the aggregate effect of immigration on wages has been found to be 
very small both in the short run and in the long run (Longhi  et al. 2005), and similar 
                                                 
14 In Italy, government statistics agency publicly blamed immigration for the country’s rising 
unemployment in 2008, while rising unemployment in Spain led the government to launch a program 
where unemployed immigrants were paid to return to their home countries – in the first few months of the 
scheme less than 1,400 out of 100,000 eligible immigrants signed up. (Papademetriou et al. 2009) 
Box 1: Global gains from migration  
Even though quantitative estimates of the direct gains from migration are difficult to obtain, 
economic simulations suggest that an increase in South-North migration would produce 
substantial  income  gains  in  the  long-run;  these  income  gains  could  exceed  those  from 
comprehensive  trade  liberalization;  and  the  destination  countries  in  the  North  would 
capture one fifth the overall benefits of increased immigration (World Bank 2006, Winters 
et  al.  2003,  Anderson  &  Winters  2008,  van  der  Mensbrugghe  &  Roland-Holst  2009). 
Documented welfare gains from South-North migration work primarily though the increase 
in  the  available  labor  force.  Ortega  and  Peri  (2009)  found  that  immigration  increases 
employment in the destination countries in the North one for one, implying no crowding-
out of natives. This result implies that immigration increases the total GDP of the receiving 
country without affecting average wages or labor productivity.  
 
Immigration  has  also  been  observed  to  boost  productivity  through  innovation  and 
specialization. Data from the United States show that one percent increase in the share of 
migrant university graduates increase the number of patent applications and grants issued 
per capita (Chellaraj et al. 2008, Hunt & Gauthier-Loiselle 2008). However, burdensome 
regulatory  requirements  and  procedures  that  foreign  doctors,  engineers,  architects  and 
accountants  have  to  meet  in  order  to  practice  in  the  destination  country  can  impose 
significant financial and other costs on these highly skilled immigrants (Mattoo and Mishra 
2009). Also the less-educated immigrants increase labor productivity as they complement 
the uneducated local labor force that, based on their knowledge of the local language and 
institutions, will be better able to specialize in more productive complementary tasks (Peri 
& Spaber 2009). Furthermore, immigrants are often willing to do jobs that locals no longer 
are interested in, such as care for the elderly (UNDP 2009, p. 85). Also, the availability of 
low-cost childcare by the immigrants can enable young local women to go back to work 
(Kremer & Watt 2006) thus boosting economic development further.  13 
 
findings in the context of South-South migration has been confirmed by Ratha and Shaw 
(2007).  Simulations  from  a  general  equilibrium  model  by  van  der  Mansbrugghe  and 
Roland-Holst (2009) suggest that reducing migration will not necessarily result in higher 
wages for native workers in receiving countries, since lower levels of migration will also 
lower the relative return to capital, which in turn will put downward pressure on wages.   
The fiscal impact of immigration depends on the costs and contributions of the 
immigrant population to the welfare system of the host country. How extensive the social 
safety nets and welfare services are and to what extent migrants are allowed to access the 
domestic  welfare  system  determines  the  cost  on  the  host  society,  while  their  role  as 
taxpayers  determine  their  contributions  to  the  system.  The  US  Congressional  Budget 
Office  estimated  that  comprehensive  immigration  reform  including  legalization  of 
undocumented immigrants, if undertaken, would increase federal revenues to a similar 
extent as the increase in federal spending on social security, healthcare and other benefits 
for the immigrants (CBO 2006). In the UK, already the first-generation migrants were 
found to do well economically and to make a net fiscal contribution (Gott & Johnston 
2002). However, the limited fiscal implication of immigrants may also be due to the fact 
that many of them are not eligible for most benefits, and will thus need to turn to family 
networks instead (Papademitriou et al. 2009). In the developing countries the welfare 
benefits  might  not  be  as  numerous,  and  neither  is  the  tax  contribution  of  mostly 
undocumented immigrants likely to be substantial, but the migrants’ value added to the 
production and economic growth is still a net gain for the country. Whether positive or 
negative, the net fiscal impacts of immigration are not likely to be large (UNDP 2009, p. 
89). When it comes to the provision of health care, however, the destination countries in 
the South might face an increased burden.  Irregular migrants in the South may have 
health needs that often remain unaddressed (UNDP 2009, p. 55).
15 
 
                                                 
15 For instance, HIV prevalence is observed to rise with migration  and the situation is made worse by the 
fact that in every fifth destination country there are laws, regulations or policies that present obstacles to 
effective HIV prevention, treatment, care and support for migrants (UNAIDS 2008, 114). While people 
with HIV commonly return to live with family members to obtain care, some people with AIDS-related 
opportunistic infections migrate to obtain health care (Crush et al. 2005). This could involve cross-border 
movements to a country perceived to have better health care facilities.   14 
 
3.2 Social impacts on the destination countries in the South 
Apart from the increased competition at the labor markets, increasing inflows of 
migrants impose an integration challenge in all areas of social life. In many of the 
developing countries, however, policies to manage immigration are lacking while control 
of the same is failing to curtain the inflow of migrants due to scarce resources, weak 
administrative capacity, and porous borders. Some of the cross-border migration is often 
widely  accepted  (Adepoju  2005),  but  sometimes  immigrants  even  from  neighboring 
countries  are  treated  as  unwanted  foreigners  (Crush  2000).  This  inability  to  control 
migration and to integrate the newcomers has at times led to dramatic actions and great 
human suffering. When the economy is already under pressure, failure of integration has 
sometimes  led  to  massive  expulsions  of  migrants  mostly  in  the  South.  The  Nigerian 
Government, for instance, expelled over 2 million immigrants mainly from Ghana in 
1983  due  to  a  domestic  economic  crisis,  for  which  the  aliens  became  scapegoats 
(Lassailly-Jacob et al. 2006). More recent examples of forced repatriation can be found 
both in the North as well as in the South: the United States deported more than 350,000 
immigrants and South Africa 300,000 in 2008 alone (UNDP 2009, p. 99). The case of 
Cote d’Ivoire, where striping of immigrants of some of their rights sparked a chaos that 
has led the once stable country to the verge of an internal conflict, illustrates the growing 
intolerance  to  foreigners  in  the South  (Adepoju  2003,  UNDP  2009).  These  instances 
highlight  the  importance  of  strengthening  migration  and  integration  policies  in 
developing countries as they host large numbers of immigrants. 
The challenge of integration is most prominent in urban areas. Most internal 
as well as international migrants end up in the cities of developing countries because of 
employment  opportunities,  with  many  working  in  the  informal  sector  of  business, 
transport, crafts and services. For example, a quarter of the population of Libreville in 
Gabon is from another country from Central Africa and West Africa (Lassailly-Jacob et 
al. 2006). Sometime the movement is driven by the falling living standards and weak 
support services in the source community (World Bank 2009). If the excess supply of 
labor is combined with poor ability of the local authorities to manage immigration, the 
result is commonly increased disparities and expansion of slum areas in the cities (UNDP 15 
 
2009, p. 87). Forced migration can also contribute to urbanization. War, environmental 
degradation, and economic crisis lead to large population movements from rural areas 
into cities where people take refuge. There are allegedly 2 million Somalis in Mogadishu, 
mostly  refugees  escaping  the  fighting  in  their  villages  and  seeking  protection  of  the 
NGOs  or  the  warlords  (Lassailly-Jacob  et  al.  2006).  The  rapid  expansion  of  cities 
combined  with  weak  local  administration  or  lack  of  migration  policies  have  led  to 
desperate actions by the host countries officials. In Dhaka, Bangladesh, 60,000 people 
were forcibly cleared from the slums in early 2007; in Jakarta, Indonesia, migrants are 
required to show proof of employment and housing to enter the city; and in Zimbabwe 
(internal) migrants were evicted from shanty towns around Harare in 2005 (UNDP 2009, 
p. 87). Migration is only a part of the urbanization challenge, but the interaction between 
migration and rapid urbanization is likely to be important for policy in the destination 
countries in the South.    
 
 4. Conclusion   
Before presenting the policy recommendations, it would be useful to point out a 
few emerging themes in the literature and public debates on the impact of migration on 
climate change, political institutions, fertility and national security.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted already in 1990 
that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on migration (IOM 2008). It 
predicted that as many as 200 million people may be forced to migrate by 2050 because 
of climate change (Myers 2005).
16 Dasgupta and others (2007, 2010) estimate that rising 
sea levels, tidal waves and storm surges could displace millions of people in Bangladesh, 
some of whom might seek refuge in neighboring countries. The effects of migration on 
climate change, on the other hand, are less understood. It is generally assumed, that short 
term and circular migrants make little investment in maintaining the ecological stability 
of  their  destination  while  long-term  immigrants  have  an  incentive  to  invest  in 
                                                 
16 Identifying adaptation and resettlement strategies have been called for to deal with the emigration 
pressure imposed by the climate change (Martin 2010). 16 
 
environmental  management.
17  When  migration is induced by a conflict or a natural 
disaster leading to a sudden inflow of migrants,  the displaced people may resort to 
unsustainable activities in absence of other means of survival   exacerbating existing 
environmental problems and creating new ones (Hugo 2008). Large refugee camps have 
especially been observed to put pressure on the ecosystem.
18  McNally et al. (2002) argue 
that even long-term migration can affect the environment through increased competition 
for limited resources. On the other hand, migration can work as a channel for adoption of 
new techniques and raw materials, leading to more environmentally friendly production 
and consumption practices.  
Migration  can  have  important  implications  for  domestic  institutions  and 
politics. The emigration of capable people may cause loss of governance capacity in 
countries where institutions are already weak. Also, emigration can serve as a way to 
release political pressure, which diminishes the incentives of the established political elite 
to reform, increases corruption, and reduces overall government effectiveness (Castles & 
Delgado Wise 2008, Chami 2008).
19 Some observers have suggested that dependence on 
migration can create a ―remittance-based development model‖ where remittances become 
increasingly  critical  for  maintaining  socioeconomic  stability  in  the  migrant-sending 
country (Delgado-Wise and Márquez 2006, Delgado-Wise and Guarnizo 2007). Migrants 
may also  serve as  a channel  for  democratic  attitudes  and behaviors absorbed in  host 
countries to spread in their countries of origin, via visits, migrant returns, and cross-
border  communication,  which  can  improve  accountability  (Levitt  1998,  Perez-
Armendariz & Crow 2010, Cordova & Hiskey 2009).  
                                                 
17 Yet, Black and Sessay (1997) compared the behavior of refugees to local population in Senegal, and 
found little or no evidence to support the expectation that refugees use more fuel wood than local residents. 
18 One of the most reported cases is the Virunga national park in North Kivu where thousands of Rwandan 
refugees who were brought there in 1994 engaged in intensive woodcutting and poaching (Lassailly-Jacob 
et al. 2006) 
19 The risk of institutional degradation may not, however, be as large for remittances-receiving countries 
compared to similar effects in resource rich countries, since remittances are widely dispersed, the bulk of 
them are allocated in small amounts, and where the money does not go through the government, also the 
risk of corruption is diminished (World Bank 2006, Birdsall and Subramanian 2004). 17 
 
Migration  also  shapes  values  and  attitudes  towards  gender  roles  within  the 
household (Ghosh 2009).
 20 When women move their role as caregivers changes, and men 
have been found to be more likely to engage in reproductive activities such as caring for 
the children and the elderly (King & Vullnetari 2006). When the men emigrate, women 
are empowered to take more prominent part of the community decision making, control 
their own income, and expand their role in the domestic sphere (Deshingkar & Grimm 
2005, p. 39). Even other domestic norms, such as greater emphasis on girls’ schooling, 
higher age of marriage, can filter from the destination country to the sending society 
(Fargues 2007)
21. Migration decision is also an integral part of family planning decisions 
and lead to differences in fertility rates among migrants and non -migrants (Singley & 
Landale 1998, Fargues 2007)
22. Studies find migrants’ fertility to resemble more closely 
that of natives at destination, either due to social adaptation or self-selection of migrants 
by fertility preferences (Kulu 2005, Chattopadhyay et al. 2006), although there can be 
regional variations.
23  
Forced migration due to  conflicts, persecution, or sudden impoverishment may 
lead to international migration across borders  even while large migrant groups end up 
being internally displaced refugees in their own country (Newland  et al. 2003, Martin 
2001). For internally displaced population, the hostility across the different groupings in 
the country causes tension for regions hosting refugees, while the international refugee 
camps  involve  the  possibility  of  international  conflict.
24  When the size of a refugee 
population  increases  over time, which  is  not uncommon  as  conflicts  es calate,  host 
communities are often overwhelmed and feel that their resources are threatened  (Ek & 
                                                 
20 Another theme drawing a lot of discussion but with scant empirical evidence and rigorous analysis is 
gender and migration. This theme appears to be beyond the scope of this paper focused on development 
impacts. 
21 The evidence on the diffusion of the cultural norms is still tentative, and households demonstrate 
considerable flexibility in restructuring their roles to accommodate seasonal migrations (Hampshire 2006).  
22 Beine et al. (2009) find that one percent decrease in the fertility norm in the migrant destination countries 
reduces fertility rates in the origin country by about 0.3 percent. 
23 For migrants who came from economically well-off areas of Kenya, outmigration was associated with 
falling fertility rates, while for migrants from peripheral areas migration and consequently remittances 
allowed for higher fertility (Ochola Omondi & Ayiemba 2003). 
24 Refugee camps built close to the boarder allow imposing a threat of military intrusion or the camps 
themselves to become militarized (Lassailly-Jacob et al. 2006). The host countries may also use the 
refugees to put political and military pressure on the leaders of their countries of origin. 18 
 
Karadawi 1991).
25 If, on the other hand, the refugees are allowed to and are able to find 
jobs  and  send  home  remittances,  these  could  also  be  a  valuable  resour ce  for 
reconstruction (Castles & Miller 2009, p. 61).  
There  are  also  wider  security   concerns  suggesting  that  migrants  would  be 
disproportionately involved in criminal activity than natives (Mattes et al. 2000, Danso 
& McDonald 2001, Quirk 2008), even though data to support such a claim are lacking 
(Crush  &  Williams  2002)
26.  Providing  support  mechanisms  for  youth  at  risk,  and 
ensuring proper integration of the migrants will be ways to diminish the risk of violence 
and manage the development impact of migration. 
Although  most  remittances  sent  by  migrants  are  legitimate  transfers,  the 
continued  existence  and  use  of  informal  channels  has  raised  concerns  of  money 
laundering,  terrorist  financing  and  financial  crimes  leading  to  heavy  regulation  of 
providers of remittance services. The need for such alternative channels arise from the 
sustained  high  cost  of  remitting  through  formal  financial  institutions,  cumbersome 
legislation related to money transfers, and mistrust of the migrants towards the financial 
institutions (Shehu 2004, Lucas 2004, Maimbo 2004, Ratha and Riedberg 2005, Irving et 
al. 2010). Informality is particularly prevalent in the ―South-South‖ remittance corridors 
(Ratha and Shaw 2007, Bracking and Sachikonye 2008).  
Migration  does  not  only  imply  movement  of  people,  but  also  movement  of 
cultures  (Castles  &  Miller  2009,  p.  41).  Successful  assimilation  to  the  destination 
country requires the migrants to interact with the new society, while keeping the culture 
of the origin country alive creates a positive environment for the multicultural identity to 
form (Guarnizo et al. 2003, Faist & Gerdes 2008).  On the other hand, some migrants 
may resort to the customs of the origin country more rigorously as they would have done 
back  home.  This  highlights  the  importance  of  integration  of  the  immigrants,  and 
supporting them in the creation and formation of their new multicultural identity. 
                                                 
25 For example, Kenya serves as a host country to hundreds of thousands of individuals living in camps 
without the ability to integrate into the local workforce or acquire sustainable sources of income (Banki 
2004). 
26 In USA, for example, the incarceration rate of the locally born men aged 18-39  was 3.5 percent, while 
the same rate for foreign born was merely 0.7 in 2000 (IPC 2007). In Europe, however, there are generally 
more foreign-born in prison than locals, even though the results vary by country (Mucherjee 1999). 19 
 
Selected policy suggestions 
There  is  a  vast  literature  discussing  policy  recommendations  that  nurture  the 
benefits and mitigate the negative effects of migration. Before concluding, we briefly 
summarize  a  few  selected  policy  suggestions  such  as  integrating  migration  and 
development  policies (both in South  and North), facilitating the flow on remittances, 
improving recruitment practices, and facilitating international labor mobility.  
Migration should be incorporated both in the development cooperation strategies 
in the North, as well as in the national poverty reduction strategies in the South (Clemens 
2010). Although as of yet rare in practice (UNDP 2009, p. 82), there are some cases of 
successful  strategies  for  cooperative  efforts  between  the  sending  and  the  receiving 
countries to manage migration (Martin et al. 2002).
27 Areas of cooperation include the 
drivers of migration in the source country, networks that move people across borders, and 
integrating the legal migrants into their destination countries.  
While many developing countries have large stocks of immigrants, v ery few of 
them have explicit policies on how to deal with immigration or the capacity to manage 
their borders effectively. Similarly to the destination countries in the North, there are 
calls in developing countries to focus on attracting the highly skilled migrants, discourage 
irregular migration, and reports of growing xenophobia (Lucas 2006).  Empowering the 
sending and receiving countries in the South to manage international mobility will benefit 
the migrants, the host societies and the country of origin. 
Statistics on migration and remittances are often of poor quality , especially in 
developing countries. Few statistics measure migration flows and data are even scarcer 
when it comes to transit, circular, or irregular migration (World Bank 2010b,  p. 25-26). 
Official  estimates  of  remittance  flows  are  usually  gross underestimates  of  the true 
volumes, since  a large portion of remittances are sent through unofficial channels.
28 
                                                 
27 For instance, Mali and France initiated annual bilateral consultations at the ministerial level to discuss the 
integration of Malians who want to remain in France, co-management of migration flows, and cooperative 
development in emigration areas in Mali. Italy and Albania, on the other hand, have collaborated in a joint 
police program to combat smuggling and trafficking. (For more examples, see Martin et al. 2002) 
28 Data collected by the central banks sometime do not distinguish remittances from other low-value 
transfers such as small-value trade payments. In a recent survey of the central banks (Irving et al. 2010) 20 
 
Improving  data  collection  can  facilitate  better  policies  to  enhance  migration  for 
development.
29  
The  development  community  can  further  leverage  remittance  flows  for 
development by making them cheaper, safer and more productive for both the sending 
and the receiving countries. An ―International Remittances Agenda‖ would involve: (1) 
monitoring, analysis and projections; (2) improving retail payment systems through use 
of  better  technologies  and  appropriate  regulatory  changes;  (3)  linking  remittances  to 
financial access at the household level; and (4) leveraging remittances for capital market 
access at the institutional or macro levels (Ratha 2007).   
As  the  labor  market  becomes  increasingly  global,  the  educational  policies  in 
developing countries will need to be revised to invest in skills that are needed within the 
country as well as in the global labor markets. On the other hand, the race for talent has 
led  some  destination  country  institutions  to  actively  engage  in  recruitment  of  highly 
educated  migrants,  such  as  doctors.  However,  attempts  to  regulate  skilled-worker 
mobility, or so-called ―ethical recruitment policies‖, does little to address the underlying 
causes  of  emigration  decisions,  and  often  leads  to  unintended  adverse  consequences 
(Clemens 2009). The freedom of mobility should thus be allowed for all skill-levels, 
while complementary measures can be developed to foster service provision and skill 
development in the source country.  
Recruitment companies account often for the majority of the cost of migrating, 
especially when it comes to low-skilled migrants (Lucas 2005, p. 278) that can leave the 
migrant in debt, lower wages than promised, long hours and unsafe working conditions 
(see  e.g.  Chammartin  2005).  Facilitating  migration  through  safe  and  legal  channels 
through better monitoring of recruitment processes and bilateral coordination will help to 
protect the rights of the migrants and fight exploitation and trafficking (UNDP 2009, p. 
103). Providing knowledge about the migration process and language of the destination 
                                                                                                                                                 
wide discrepancies were discovered between the true estimated remittance flows and the figures reported in 
the balance of payment statistics to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
29 A recent report by the Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and 
Policy (2009) suggest five concrete steps towards improved availability and quality of migrant and 
remittance data. Further guidance can be found in Black & Skeldon (2009). 21 
 
country will also enhance integration and quicker adjustment of migrants to the new labor 
market (UNDP 2009, p. 104).
30  
Migrants, especially those in an undocumented or irregular situation, are likely to 
face discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and abuse at all stages of the migration 
process (GMG 2010). Female migrants and children often face greater risks, including of 
trafficking and being deprived of education and access to healthcare.  Protecting the 
human  rights  of  migrants  is  part  of  the  obligations  of  the  State  to  respect  the 
internationally guaranteed rights of all persons, to protect those rights against abuses, and 
to fulfill the rights necessary for them to enjoy a life of dignity and security (GMG 2010). 
Immigration  and border  control policies need  to  recognize that migration is 
primarily an economic phenomenon (Ratha 2009). Evidence from the US-Mexico border 
suggests that increasing the number of border control  agents increases smuggler’s fees, 
but is unlikely to curtail the number of migrants as intended (Hanson et al. 1999, Durand 
and Massey 2002, Martin 2004, Passel and Suro 2005). Instead, providing legal channels 
for temporary migration when labor is in high demand in the destination country is more 
likely to enhance the benefits of migration for all parties. 
In conclusion, migration and remittances can be a valuable complement to broad-
based  development  efforts.  Yet,  migration  and  remittances  (collective  or  individual) 
should not be viewed as a substitute for official development aid as they are private 
money that should not be expected to fund public projects. Also, not all poor households 
receive  remittances  and  official  funds  are  needed  to  address  the  needs  of  these 
households.  Harnessing  the  development  potential  of  migration  and  remittances  by 
increasing the awareness of the decision makers and improving data on remittances and 
migration; facilitating labor mobility and recruitment across borders, while allowing for 
safe and affordable mechanisms for sending money back; and combating the increase of 
                                                 
30 For instance, the Philippines government organizes mandatory orientation courses for migrants prior to 
leaving where they learn about destination country customs and laws, resources available to them at the 
embassy or consulates, important contacts for any problems that might arise, and financial management 
(Ruiz 2008). The ―Swedish for Immigrants‖ course offered for newcomers in Sweden free of charge with 
specific classes designed for uneducated or illiterate immigrants and highly educated professionals who 
need specific vocabulary to be able to work in Sweden, respectively, is a good example of such training. 22 
 
fear-based xenophobia and overregulation are some ingredients along the way towards a 
migration policy that benefits both migrant-sending and receiving countries.  
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